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COMMENT
COMPUTERIZED HIGHWAYS AND THE SEARCH
FOR PRIVACY IN THE CASE LAW
Ronald D. Rotunda"
The new technology governing intelligent highways is like a
knife that cuts both ways. It should give us, for example, greater fuel
efficiency, and speedier and safer travel. However, it can also give us
less privacy in the use of the highways.
In one sense, we are told not to worry. After all, in the old days,
when most people lived in small towns, everyone knew everyone else,
and there were no secrets. Town gossips quickly told and retold
everything, but "gossip," unlike "privacy," is a word that has pejora-
tive connotations.' People generally do not like to have others gossip
about them, and, as they moved to the cities, they valued the privacy
that larger cities afforded them.
The new computerized technology, with its ability to collect,
store, retain, catalog, and retrieve massive amounts of data with light-
ening speed and accuracy, has the ability to challenge this privacy.
We are also told that what happens on the public streets and side-
walks is not private, and so intelligent highways do not really impli-
cate privacy at all. In one sense, this is true. Anyone can see your car
and its unique license plate when you travel on the city streets. The
Supreme Court elaborated this fact in United States v. Knotts,2 when it
held that there was no Fourth Amendment violation, no unlawful
search and seizure, if the police monitor the signal of a beeper placed
in a container of chloroform that was transported by car from Minne-
sota to a cabin in Wisconsin.
The authorities in Knotts secured no search warrant to install
their beeper. The chemical company officers had consented to the
Copyright 1995 by the author.
t The Albert E. Jenner, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. In
writing this article, I am indebted to my colleague, John Nowak, for our many conversations
regarding privacy, its importance, and its protection.
1. See generally, RoNAi. D. ROTUNDA, THE PoLrmcs OF LANGUAGE (U. Iowa Press,
1986), (explaining how words both mold and reflect the way we think).
2. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
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installation of a beeper inside the five gallon drum of chemicals, but
they sold it to the purchasers of the drum, who were ignorant about the
beeper. This surreptitious electronic surveillance enabled the police
to discover a fully operable, clandestine drug laboratory in the Wis-
consin cabin.
Justice Rehnquist, for the Court, rejected the Fourth Amendment
claims and held that the monitoring did not violate any legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy but only allowed the police to obtain information
that the authorities could have obtained through visual surveillance.
Justice Rehnquist argued:
A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from
one place to another. When Petschen [one of the defendants] trav-
eled over the public streets he voluntarily conveyed to anyone who
wanted to look the fact that he was travelling over particular roads
in a particular direction, the fact of whatever stops he made, and the
fact of his final destination when he exited from public roads onto
private property. 3
Rehnquist went on to explain that while Knotts, another defend-
ant and the owner of the Wisconsin cabin, had a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy "insofar as the cabin was concerned," there was "no
such expectation of privacy extended to the visual observation of Pet-
schen's automobile arriving on his premises after leaving a public
highway, nor to movement of objects such as the drum of chloroform
outside the cabin in the open fields."'
One wonders if a layperson would be entirely persuaded by the
reasoning in this and similar cases. 5 Granted, the authorities could
have stationed a police officer every fifteen feet on the highway, if
they knew on which highways the driver would be traveling. How-
ever, that tactic is a tad conspicuous, and the people in the car, even if
3. 460 U.S. at 281-82. See also, e.g., Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plu-
rality opinion) "A car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public thorough-
fares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain view."
4. 460 U.S. at 282, citing, Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924). See also, Oliver
v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984)( holding that the Fourth Amendment does not prevent the
government from inspecting "open fields" of a private land owner even though the person had
taken steps to prohibit trespassers from entering the land in question.)
5. E.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)(holding that when the telephone com-
pany installed, at the request of the police, a pen register device which records the numbers
dialed from a telephone, that did not constitute a "search" under the Fourth Amendment because
there was no "legitimate expectation of privacy" in the phone numbers that one dials) and Flor-
ida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989)(holding that no search warrant was required when a police
officer, in helicopter circling about 400 feet above a partially covered green house in the back of
a private home, viewed the interior of the greenhouse and saw marijuana plants).
[Vol. 11
19951 COMPUTERIZED HIGHWAYS AND THE SEARCH FOR PRIVACY 121
they were not expecting to be tailed, would have a sense that they
were being followed. Knotts does not require the police to inform a
suspect that he or she is being followed.
Moreover, there is the question of expense, which placed a check
on the police in the era before the emergence of modem technology
and cheap computing power. Assume that the police are following
someone driving on the city streets without the use of a beeper. Even
if the suspect would not distinguish the army of undercover agents
from all the other people on the streets, the constabulary simply could
not afford this army as part of any routine surveillance. The beeper
makes doable and economically feasible what would, in earlier years,
be a profligate, extravagant fantasy.
Instead of the army of agents, the police could use an undercover
vehicle to follow the mysterious drum and the car transporting it. That
action would be both more economical and less indiscrete. But if the
police did that, the defendants, who could not elude the hidden beeper,
could elude the visual surveillance. In fact, that is what happened in
Knotts. In addition to the beeper, the authorities visually followed the
car, but lost it. In fact, the authorities even lost the beeper signal, but
eventually found it again with the help of additional, modem technol-
ogy, a monitoring device in a helicopter.
In short, technology allows the police to engage in surveillance
that would otherwise be less furtive and crafty, more difficult, expen-
sive (often prohibitively so), and time consuming. The Supreme
Court's analysis in Knotts does not take into account these concerns.
In a society without modem technology and computerized re-
trieval of data, a sleuth with sufficient time and money could accumu-
late a lot of data about anyone, merely by watching what one does on
the public streets, noting where one shops and what he or she'buys,
watching which magazines are deposited in one's mail box, examining
one's abandoned garbage, collecting publicly available court records
of birth certificates, divorce decrees, marriage licenses, and so forth.6
Yet Warren and Brandeis, in their seminal article on privacy published
over a century ago, recognized that one does not lose all interest in
privacy just because information may, somewhere, be part of some
record that is publicly available, and that someone, with a great
amount of diligence, may be able to find that record.' Or, as Chief
Justice Rehnquist noted more recently, that an "event is not wholly
6. Cf. Kenneth L. Karst, "The Files:" Legal Controls Over the Accuracy and Accessibil-
ity of Stored Personal Data, 31 LAw & CoNTEMZ. PROBS. 342, 344 (1966).
7. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HLv. L. REv. 193,
198 (1890-1891).
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'private' does not mean that an individual has no interest in limiting
disclosure or dissemination of the information."8
Knotts illustrates that the Court has been generally unsympathetic
to using the Fourth Amendment to protect privacy claimed to be in-
vaded by the use of the new technology affecting highways and the
outdoors. However, it is incorrect to conclude that the Court will be
unwilling to protect such privacy interests if the claim is based on
other constitutional rights. The jury is still out on that question, but
there are suggestions in other cases, not relying on the Fourth Amend-
ment, that may indicate a judicial concern for the privacy implications
of the new technology. From these other cases, the Court might fash-
ion tools to expand privacy protection.
I do not mean to suggest that we should only look to the Supreme
Court to balance legitimate expectations of privacy with the reason-
able needs of law enforcement. As citizens we should not abdicate
our own responsibilities. Legislators and regulators, especially when
drafting statutes and regulations, should also be sensitive to the needs
of privacy in light of increasingly sophisticated technology. 9
Some people think of the Constitution as a magical pifiata that,
when hit at the right angle, will give us the answers to all of our social
problems. Yet, the fact that something is constitutional does not mean
that it wise and just. Because the government may constitutionally be
able to place a beeper on a vehicle without obtaining a warrant does
not mean that there should never be any legislative or regulatory limits
to the collection and retention of data about vehicles on the public
highways. 10
8. Hon. William H. Rehnquist, Is an Expanded Right of Privacy Consistent with Fair and
Effective Law Enforcement?, NELSON TIMoTHY ST mnENs LEcrUnnS, UvvsrrY or KANSAS
LAw ScHooi, 13 (Sept. 26-27, 1974), quoted in, United States Department of Justice v. Report-
ers Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 770-71 (1989).
9. Cf., Illinois v. Abbott & Associates, Inc., 460 U.S. 557 (1983). A federal law author-
ized the Attorney General to make federal grand jury antitrust materials available to a state
attorney general. The Court held that this statute did not dispense with the normal requirements
of a showing of a particularized need by the state for the grand jury material. The Court, thus,
limited the Government official's right to disclose information about individuals by its interpre-
tation of the applicable statutes and court rules. See also, Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S.
301 (1979)(holding that the NLRB cannot compel a company to disclose to a union the results of
psychological tests on individual employees unless those employees consented. The Court inter-
preted the labor laws and concluded that the employee's right to confidentiality outweighed the
union's assertion of a need for the data).
10. See generally, H.R. Rep. No. 1416, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 3 et seq., reprinted in, LEois-
LATIVE HISTORy OF THm PRIVACY Acr oF 1974, SoucE BOOK ON PRIVACY, at 294, 399 (1974),
which lists various state laws requiring that computerized, cumulative, indexed criminal histori-
cal information be kept confidential.
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In short, although a future Court may not use the Fourth Amend-
ment to create new privacy rights in this area, and although legislators,
regulators, and the general public should not abdicate their responsi-
bility to be sensitive to, and watchful of, privacy concerns, there may
be other constitutional clauses that may supply added protection. Let
us look at some of the precedent outside of the Fourth Amendment
area'1 to see what tools that caselaw offers future courts to limit gov-
ernment computerized collection and use of data about private
individuals.
Whalen v. Roe' 2 is one important case to consider. The Court
unanimously upheld a New York state law requiring physicians and
pharmacists to forward copies of prescriptions for medicines contain-
ing narcotics to state authorities. In reaching this conclusion, the
Court's reasoning was interesting, because it applied a methodology
that did not dismiss the constitutional argument as frivolous; in addi-
tion, it suggested some important factors to consider in evaluating the
privacy claim. Whalen was not a Fourth Amendment case. Rather,
the Court considered the liberty, due process interest of the patients
and doctors objecting to the reporting, retention, and possible abuse of
the information collected.
Justice Stevens, for the majority, found that the state law related
to the legitimate and "vital" function of controlling illegal drug distri-
bution. 13 Furthermore, the law was reasonable in its limitations on the
use and distribution of the collected data. The mere possibility that
the data would be improperly used did not void the law on its face.
The Court thus concluded that the state law, on its face, did not violate
any privacy expectation that the government not make an individual's
private affairs public. 4
The Court also turned to another aspect of privacy. The appel-
lees had argued that even if unwarranted public disclosures do not
actually occur, "the knowledge that the information is readily avail-
able in a computerized file creates a genuine concern that causes some
persons to decline needed medication." 5 The Court rejected this ar-
gument as well because, although there was evidence that some people
may have been discouraged from using medication by the existence of
the computerized data files, "it also is clear, however, that about
100,000 prescriptions for such drugs were being filled each month
11. On the fourth amendment, see generally, WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEzMRu: A
T.EA-nsE ON TH FouTam AMENDMENT (2d ed. 1987)(with annual pocket parts).
12. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
13. 429 U.S. at 598.
14. 429 U.S. at 600.
15. 429 U.S. at 602-03.
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prior to the entry of the District Court's injunction. Clearly, therefore,
the statute did not deprive the public of access to the drugs."' 6 Thus,
the Court found that there was no violation of any liberty interest
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Significantly, in considering the privacy implications of the com-
puterized file of information, the Court added a cautionary note: "We
are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of
vast amounts of persrnal information in computerized data banks or
other massive government files." Justice Stevens, for the Court, ad-
mitted that the government must collect and preserve a lot of informa-
tion related to the collection of taxes, the distribution of welfare
benefits, the supervision of public health, and so forth. Much of this
information "is personal in character and potentially embarrassing or
harmful if disclosed." Thus, the
right to collect and use such data for public purposes is typically
accompanied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid
unwarranted disclosures. Recognizing that in some circumstances
that duty arguably has its roots in the Constitution, nevertheless
New York's statutory scheme, and its implementing administrative
procedures, evidence a proper concern with, and protection of, the
individual's intereit in privacy. We therefore need not, and do not,
decide any question which might be presented by the unwarranted
disclosure of accumulated private data - whether intentional or
unintentional - or by a system that did not contain comparable
security provisions. We simply hold that this record does not es-
tablish an invasion of any right or liberty protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment. 17
Justice Stevens thus left open the opportunity for the Court to
find a constitutional privacy interest in a case where the record
showed that the accumulation of vast amounts of personal information
in computerized data banks was not accompanied by a statutory and
regulatory scheme that evidenced "a proper concern with, and protec-
tion, of, an individual's interest in privacy." This duty, said the Court,
"arguably has its roots in the Constitution."
Justice Stewart, concurring, was the only Justice who disassoci-
ated himself from the implications of the majority opinion. I" In con-
trast, Justice Brennan's concurring opinion welcomed them. Brennan
recognized that the central storage and easy accessibility of computer-
ized data "vastly increase the potential for abuse of that information,"
16. 429 U.S. at 603.
17. 429 U.S. at 605-06 (emphasis added).
18. 429 U.S. at 608-09 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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and foresaw that future developments might demonstrate the necessity
of some curb on such technology. In this case, because New York's
"carefully designed" statute limited access and prevented abuse, Bren-
nan agreed with the opinion of the Court that the law, on its face, did
not deprive anyone of any "constitutionally protected privacy inter-
ests." But if the statute, on its face or as applied, did create such a
deprivation, it "would only be consistent with the Constitution if it
were necessary to promote a compelling state interest."' 9
United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press,2" lends support for the concerns that the major-
ity and Justice Brennan expressed in Whalen. In Reporters Committee
the Court held that events summarized in FBI's rap sheets regarding
individuals was exempt from disclosure by the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act.2 In Reporters Committee it was argued that the privacy
interests of the individuals on whom information was collected and
retained in these rap sheets "approaches zero" because all the informa-
tion had previously been disclosed to the public.22 The Court rejected
that "cramped notion of personal privacy."23
Without a dissent, the majority noted that the common law "rec-
ognized a privacy interest in matters made part of the public record."24
The Court went on to explain that there is a difference between "scat-
tered disclosure of the bits of information contained in a rap sheet and
[the] revelation of the rap sheet as a whole."' Government resources
create and maintain the files and the indexes, making easily available
information that otherwise would be difficult and expensive to main-
tain and retrieve. Significantly, the Court added:
Plainly there is a vast difference between the public records that
might be found after a diligent search of courthouse files, county
archives, and local police stations throughout the country and a
computerized summary located in a single clearinghouse of
information.26
19. 429 U.S. at 607 (Brennan, J., concurring)(citing Roe v. wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973))
and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 464 (1972)(White, J., concurring). Roe dealt with a right
to abortion and Eisenstadt dealt with access to birth control pills and devices by unmarried
people.
20. 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
21. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(West 1977).
22. 489 U.S. at 763.
23. Id.
24. 489 U.S. at 763 n.15. The Court acknowledged that the privacy interest was dimin-
ished and a private person who obtained the information might be privileged to publish it, citing
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 494-95 (1975).
25. 489 U.S. at 764.
26. 489 U.S. at 764.
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The Court, after referring several times to the impact of comput-
erized data banks on individual privacy, concluded that disclosure of
the FBI rap sheets to third parties would constitute an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy and was thus exempt from disclosure
under the Freedom of Information Act.27
In the First Amendment arena, the Court has also found some
protection for a right of privacy related to accumulation and retrieval
of information. In these cases the focus, thus far, is more on com-
pelled disclosure of private facts rather than computerized collection
and retention of personal data. However, a basic principle that may lie
behind these cases is that privacy concerns should impose a require-
ment that government behave reasonably in collecting and protecting
the confidentiality of such data.
For example, the Court has limited, under the First Amendment,
the applicability of a campaign disclosure law requiring political par-
ties to disclose the names of their members and contributors. Such a
law is not invalid on its face, but it is unconstitutional as applied to
minor parties who demonstrate that they are subject to private or gov-
ernment hostility and that thus disclosure will impair the free speech
rights of the minor political parties.28
The Court, also relying on the First Amendment, has invalidated
laws banning unsigned handbills,2 9 or compelled disclosure of mem-
bership lists of organizations30 unless the laws were narrowly tailored
to promote a compelling or substantial government interest.
In Doe v. McMillan,3 the Court narrowly interpreted the Speech
and Debate Clause32 to protect privacy concerns. In that case, parents
of the school children in the District of Columbia sued members of the
House Committee on the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs also
sued employees of the Government Printing Office. The plaintiffs
sought damages, and declaratory and injunctive relief for alleged inva-
27. Cf. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 766-68 (1986). In the course of invalidating various state restrictions on abortions, the
Court turned to the state regulation requiring doctors to report the basis for their decision that a
fetus was not viable. Although the regulations did not require that the doctors' reports identify
the name of the women seeking an abortion, other information made it possible to identify these
women, and these reports were open to the public. The majority thus invalidated the requirement
of collecting this information because it violated the woman's right to privacy, by allowing the
disclosure of private facts.
28. Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee, 459 U.S. 87 (1982).
29. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
30. Compare N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama ex reL Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) with New
York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928) and Gibson v. Florida Legislative Inves-
tigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
31. 412 U.S. 306 (1973).
32. U.S. CoNsT., art. I, § 6.
[Vol. I11
1995] COMPUTERIZED HIGHWAYS AND THE SEARCH FOR PRIVACY 127
sion of privacy resulting from the public dissemination of a committee
report on the District of Columbia school system. This report identi-
fied students by name, and spoke in a derogatory manner about them,
calling them, for example, "class cutters."
While the Court ruled that the Speech or Debate Clause immu-
nized the members of Congress and their alter egos,33 the Court was
less protective when it turned to the public printer and the superinten-
dent of documents, who had printed excess copies of the report for use
other than internally by Congress. The Court held that the plaintiffs
had a cause of action against these other defendants. These defend-
ants were not immune under the Speech or Debate Clause because,
even though the act of distributing excess copies of the reports in-
formed the public, informing the public was not "an integral part of
the deliberative and communicative processes by which Members par-
ticipate in committee and House proceedings."34 As the Court said in
an earlier case, "no doubt there is no congressional power to expose
for the sake of exposure."
35
Cases such as Whalen v. Roe, United States Department of Jus-
tice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, and Doe v.
McMillan do not overturn the results of United States v. Knotts. How-
ever, the cases do illustrate that there may be, outside of the Fourth
Amendment, constitutional protections for privacy in the context of
the collection, retention, retrieval, and use of computerized data in-
volving the use of the public highways. Even if later opinions do not
dramatically build and expand upon these cases, they do indicate that
the Court, as well as the rest of us, should be sensitive to the novel
problems created by the ability of modern technological devices to
collect and store vast amounts of data about large numbers of individ-
uals, and the ability of cheap computer power to manipulate, organize,
retain, and retrieve this data in ways that affect the privacy of us all.
33. Le., the committee staff and the consultant to the committee and the investigator intro-
ducing material at the committee hearings.
34. 412 U.S. at 314.
35. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200(1957).

